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Abstract
Much research has been devoted to better understanding
adversarial examples, which are specially crafted inputs to
machine-learning models that are perceptually similar to
benign inputs, but are classified differently (i.e., misclassi-
fied). Both algorithms that create adversarial examples and
strategies for defending against adversarial examples typ-
ically use Lp-norms to measure the perceptual similarity
between an adversarial input and its benign original. Prior
work has already shown, however, that two images need not
be close to each other as measured by an Lp-norm to be
perceptually similar. In this work, we show that nearness
according to an Lp-norm is not just unnecessary for per-
ceptual similarity, but is also insufficient. Specifically, fo-
cusing on datasets (CIFAR10 and MNIST), Lp-norms, and
thresholds used in prior work, we show through online user
studies that “adversarial examples” that are closer to their
benign counterparts than required by commonly used Lp-
norm thresholds can nevertheless be perceptually distinct to
humans from the corresponding benign examples. Namely,
the perceptual distance between two images that are “near”
each other according to an Lp-norm can be high enough
that participants frequently classify the two images as rep-
resenting different objects or digits. Combined with prior
work, we thus demonstrate that nearness of inputs as mea-
sured by Lp-norms is neither necessary nor sufficient for
perceptual similarity, which has implications for both cre-
ating and defending against adversarial examples. We pro-
pose and discuss alternative similarity metrics to stimulate
future research in the area.
1. Introduction
Machine learning is quickly becoming a key aspect of
many technologies that impact us on a daily basis, from
automotive driving aids to city planning, from smartphone
cameras to cancer diagnosis. As such, the research com-
munity has invested substantial effort in understanding ad-
versarial examples, which are inputs to machine-learning
systems that are perceptually similar to benign inputs, but
that are misclassified, i.e., classified differently than the be-
nign inputs from which they are derived (e.g., [1, 29]). An
attacker who creates an adversarial example can cause an
object-recognition algorithm to incorrectly identify an ob-
ject (e.g., as a worm instead of as an panda) [7], a street-sign
recognition algorithm to fail to recognize a stop sign [5], or
a face-recognition system to fail to identify a person [27].
Because of the potential impact on safety and security, bet-
ter understanding the susceptibility of machine-learning al-
gorithms to adversarial examples, and devising defenses,
has been a high priority.
A key property of adversarial examples that makes them
dangerous is that human observers do not recognize them
as adversarial. If a human recognizes an input (e.g., a per-
son wearing a disguise at an airport) as adversarial, then any
potential harm may often be prevented by traditional meth-
ods (e.g., physically detaining the attacker). Hence, most
research on creating adversarial examples (e.g., [2, 23]) or
defending against them (e.g., [17, 12]) focuses on adver-
sarial examples that are imperceptible, i.e., a human would
consider them perceptually similar to benign images.
The degree to which an adversarial example is impercep-
tible from its benign original is usually measured using Lp-
norms, e.g., L0 (e.g., [23]), L2 (e.g., [29]), or L∞ (e.g., [7]).
Informally, for images, L0 measures the number of pix-
els that are different between two images, L2 measures the
Euclidean distance between two images, and L∞ measures
the largest difference between corresponding pixels in two
images. These measures of imperceptibility are critical for
creating adversarial examples and defending against them.
On the one hand, algorithms for creating adversarial ex-
amples seek to enhance their imperceptibility by produc-
ing inputs that both cause misclassification and whose dis-
tance from their corresponding benign originals has small
Lp-norm. On the other hand, defense mechanisms assume
that if the difference between two inputs is below a specific
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Lp-norm threshold then the two objects belong to the same
class (e.g., [17]).
Hence, the completeness and soundness of attacks and
defenses commonly rely on the assumption that some Lp-
norm is a reasonable measure for perceptual similarity, i.e.,
that if the Lp-norm of the difference between two objects
is below a threshold then the difference between those two
objects will be imperceptible to a human, and vice versa.
Recent work has shown that one direction of this assump-
tion does not hold: objects that are indistinguishable to hu-
mans (e.g., as a result of slight rotation or translation) can
nevertheless be very different as measured by the Lp-norm
of their difference [4, 10, 34].
In this paper we further examine the use of Lp-norms
as a measure of perceptual similarity. In particular, we ex-
amine whether pairs of objects whose difference is small
according to an Lp-norm are indeed similar to humans.
Focusing on datasets, Lp-norms, and thresholds used in
prior work, we show that small differences between im-
ages according to an Lp-norm do not imply perceptual in-
distinguishably. Specifically, using the CIFAR10 [13] and
MNIST [15] datasets, we show via online user studies that
images whose distance—as measured by the Lp-norm of
their difference—is below thresholds used in prior work can
nevertheless be perceptibly very different to humans. The
perceptual distance between two images can in fact lead
people to classify two images differently. For example, we
find that by perturbing about 4% of pixels in digit images to
achieve small L0 distance from benign images (an amount
comparable to prior work [23]), humans become likely to
classify the resulting images correctly only 3% of the time.
Combined with previous work, our results show that
nearness between two images according to an Lp-norm is
neither necessary nor sufficient for those images to be per-
ceptually similar. This has implications for both attacks and
defenses against adversarial inputs. For attacks, it suggests
that even though a candidate attack image may be within a
small Lp distance from a benign image, this does not en-
sure that a human would find the two images perceptually
similar, or even that a human would classify those two im-
ages consistently (e.g., as the same person or object). For
defenses, it implies defense strategies that attempt to train
machine-learning models to correctly classify what ought
to be an adversarial example may be attempting to solve
an extremely difficult problem, and may result in ill-trained
machine-learning models.
To stimulate future research on developing better simi-
larity metrics for comparing adversarial examples with their
benign counterparts, we propose and discuss several alter-
natives to Lp-norms. In doing so, we hope to improve at-
tacks against machine-learning algorithms, and, in return,
defenses against them.
Next, we review prior work and provide background
(Sec. 2). We then discuss the necessity and sufficiency of
conditions for perceptual similarity, and show evidence that
Lp-norms lead to conditions that are neither necessary nor
sufficient (Sec. 3–4). Finally, we discuss alternatives to Lp-
norms and conclude (Sec. 5–6).
2. Background and Related Work
In concurrent research efforts, Szegedy et al. and Biggio
et al. showed that specifically crafted small perturbations of
benign inputs can lead machine-learning models to misclas-
sify them [1, 29]. The perturbed inputs are referred to as ad-
versarial examples [29]. Given a machine-learning model,
a sample xˆ is considered as an adversarial example if it is
similar to a benign sample x (drawn from the data distribu-
tion), such that x is correctly classified and xˆ is classified
differently than x. Formally, for a classification function F ,
a class cx of x, a distance metric D, and a threshold , xˆ is
considered to be an adversarial example if:
F (x) = cx ∧ F (xˆ) 6= cx ∧D(x, xˆ) ≤  (1)
The leftmost condition (F (x) = cx) checks that x is cor-
rectly classified, the middle condition (F (xˆ) 6= cx) ensures
that xˆ is incorrectly classified, and the rightmost condition
(D(x, xˆ) ≤ ) ensures that x and xˆ are similar (i.e., their
distance is small) [1].
Interestingly, the concept of similarity is ambiguous. For
example, two images may be considered similar because
both contain the color blue, or because they are indistin-
guishable (e.g., when performing ABX tests [20]). We be-
lieve that prior work on adversarial examples implicitly as-
sumes that similarity refers to perceptual or visual similar-
ity, as stated by Engstrom et al. [4]. As Goodfellow et al.
explain, adversarial examples are “particularly disappoint-
ing because a popular approach in computer vision is to
use convolutional network features as a space where Eu-
clidean distance approximates perceptual distance” [7]. In
other words, adversarial examples are particularly of inter-
est because they counter our expectation that neural net-
works specifically, and machine-learning models in general,
represent perceptually similar inputs with features that are
similar (i.e., close) in the Euclidean space.
A common approach in prior work has been to use Lp-
distance metrics (as D) in attacks that craft adversarial ex-
amples and defenses against them (e.g., [2]). For non-
negative values of p, the Lp distance between the two d-
dimensional inputs x and xˆ is defined as [25]:
||x− xˆ||p =
( d∑
i=1
|xi − xˆi|p
) 1
p
The main Lp distances used in the literature are L0, L2,
and L∞. Attacks using L0 attempt to minimize the num-
ber of pixels perturbed [2, 23]; those using L2 attempt to
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minimize the Euclidean distance between x and xˆ [2, 29];
and attacks using L∞ attempt to minimize the maximum
change applied to any coordinate in x [2, 7].
To defend against adversarial examples, prior work has
focused on either training more robust deep neural net-
works (DNNs) that are not susceptible to small perturba-
tions [7, 11, 14, 17, 24, 29, 12], or developing techniques to
detect adversarial examples [6, 8, 18, 19, 35]. Adversarial
training is a particular defense that has achieved a relatively
high success [7, 11, 14, 17, 29]. In this defense, adversarial
examples with bounded Lp distance (usually, p = ∞) are
generated in each iteration of training DNNs, and the DNN
is trained to correctly classify those examples. Insufficiency
and lack of necessity in Lp-distance metrics have direct im-
plication on adversarial training, as we discuss in Sec. 3.
Despite the goal for adversarial examples to be percep-
tually similar to benign samples, little prior work on ad-
versarial examples has explicitly explored or accounted for
human perception. The theoretical work of Wang et al. is
an exception, as they treated the human as an oracle to seek
for the conditions under which DNNs would be robust [31].
In contrast, we take an experimental approach to show that
Lp distances may be inappropriate for defining adversarial
examples. Our findings are in line with research in psy-
chology, which has found that distance metrics in geometric
spaces may not always match humans’ assessment of simi-
larity (e.g., [30]). Concurrently to our work, Elsayed et al.
showed that adversarial examples can mislead humans as
well as DNNs [3]. While they considered images of higher
dimensionality than we consider in this work (see Sec. 4),
they allowed perturbations of higher norm than commonly
found in practice.
Some work proposed generating adversarial examples
via techniques other than minimizing Lp-norms. In three
different concurrent efforts, researchers proposed to use
minimal geometric transformations to generate adversarial
examples [4, 10, 34]. As we detail in the next section,
geometric transformations evidence that conditions on Lp-
norms are unnecessary for ensuring similarity. In other
work, researchers proposed to achieve imperceptible ad-
versarial examples by maximizing the Structural Similarity
(SSIM) with respect to benign images [25]. SSIM is a mea-
sure of perceived quality of images that has been shown to
align with human assessment [33]. It is a differentiable met-
ric with values in the interval [-1,1] (where a values closer
to 1 indicate higher similarity). By maximizing SSIM, the
researchers hoped to increase the similarity between the ad-
versarial examples and their benign counterparts. In Sec. 5
we provide a preliminary analysis of SSIM as a perceptual
similarity metric for adversarial examples.
In certain cases, perceptual similarity to a reference im-
age is not a goal for an attack (e.g., images that seem incom-
prehensible or benign to humans, but are classified as street
(a) (b)
Figure 1: Translations and rotations can fool DNNs. (a) A
dog image (right) resulting from transforming a benign im-
age (left) is classified as a cat. (b) A horse image (right)
resulting from transforming a benign image (left) is classi-
fied as a truck. Images from Engstrom et al. [4].
signs by machine-vision algorithms [16, 21, 28]). While
such attacks are important to defend against, this paper fo-
cuses on studying the notion of perceptual similarity that is
relied upon in the majority of the literature on adversarial
examples.
3. Necessity and Sufficiency of Conditions for
Perceptual Similarity
To effectively find adversarial examples and defend
against them, the parameter choice in Eqn. 1 should help
us capture the set of all interesting adversarial examples. In
particular, the selection of D and  should capture the sam-
ples that are perceptually similar to benign samples. Ideally,
we should be able to define necessary and sufficient condi-
tions for perceptual similarity via D and .
3.1. Necessity
The condition C := D(x, xˆ) ≤  is a necessary condi-
tion for perceptual similarity if:
xˆ is perceptually similar to x⇒ C
Finding necessary conditions for perceptual similarity is
important for the development of better attacks that find ad-
versarial examples, as well as better defenses. If the con-
dition C used in hopes of ensuring perceptual similarity is
unnecessary (i.e., there exist examples that are perceptually
similar to benign samples, but do not satisfy C), then the
search space of attacks may be too constrained and some
stealthy adversarial examples may not be found. For de-
fenses, and especially for adversarial training (because the
DNNs are specifically trained to prevent adversarial inputs
that satisfy C), unnecessary conditions for perceptual sim-
ilarity may lead us to fail at defending against adversarial
examples that do not satisfy C.
Attacks that craft adversarial examples via applying
slight geometric transformations (e.g., translations and ro-
tations) to benign samples [4, 10, 34] evidence that when
using Lp-distance metrics as the measure of distance, D,
we may wind up with unnecessary conditions for percep-
tual similarity. Such geometric transformations result in
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small perceptual differences with respect to benign sam-
ples, yet they result in large Lp distances. Fig. 1 shows two
adversarial examples resulting from geometric transforma-
tion of 32 × 32 images. While the adversarial examples
are similar to the benign samples, their Lp distance is large:
L0≥3,010 (maximum possible is 3,072), L2≥15.83 (maxi-
mum possible is 55.43), and L∞≥0.87 (maximum possible
is 1).1 These distances are much larger that what has been
used in prior work (e.g., [2]). Indeed, because small Lp is
not a necessary condition for perceptual similarity, state-of-
the-art defenses meant to defend against Lp-bounded adver-
saries fail at defending against adversarial examples result-
ing from geometric transformations [4].
3.2. Sufficiency
The conditionC := D(x, xˆ) ≤  is a sufficient condition
for perceptual similarity if:
C ⇒ xˆ is perceptually similar to x
Alternately, C is insufficient, if it is possible to demon-
strate that a sample xˆ is close to x underD, while in fact xˆ is
not perceptually similar to x. The sufficiency of C for per-
ceptual similarity is also important for both attacks and de-
fenses. In the case of attacks, an adversary using insufficient
conditions for perceptual similarity may craft misclassified
samples that she may deem as perceptually similar to benign
samples under C, when they are not truly so. For defenses,
the defender may be attempting to solve an extremely dif-
ficult problem by requiring that a machine-learning model
would classify inputs in a certain way, while even humans
may be misled by such inputs due to their lack of perceptual
similarity to benign inputs. In the case of adversarial train-
ing, if C is insufficient, we may even train DNNs to classify
inputs differently than how humans would (thus, potentially
poisoning the DNN).
In the next section we show that the Lp-norms com-
monly used in prior work may be insufficient for ensur-
ing perceptual similarity. We emphasize that our findings
should not be interpreted as stating that the adversarial ex-
amples reported on by prior work are not imperceptible. In-
stead, our findings highlight that commonly used Lp-norms
and associated thresholds in principle permit algorithms for
crafting adversarial examples to craft samples that are not
perceptually similar to benign ones, leading to the unde-
sirable outcomes described above. Specific instances of
algorithms that use those Lp-norms and thresholds could
still produce imperceptible adversarial examples because
the creation of these examples is constrained by factors
other than the chosen Lp-norms and thresholds.
1We use RGB pixel values in the range [0,1].
4. Experiment Design and Results
To show that a small Lp distance (p ∈ {0, 2,∞}) from
benign samples is insufficient for ensuring perceptual simi-
larity to these samples, we conducted three online user stud-
ies (one for each p). The goal of each study was to show
that, for small values of , it is possible to find samples that
are close to benign samples in Lp, but are not perceptually
similar to those samples to a human. In what follows, we
present the high-level experimental design that is common
among the three studies. Next, we report on our study par-
ticipants. Then, we provide the specific design details for
each study and the results.
4.1. Experiment Design
Due to the many ways in which two images can be sim-
ilar, it is unclear whether one can learn useful input from
users by directly asking them about the level of similarity
between image pairs. Therefore, we rely on indirect reason-
ing to determine whether an image xˆ is perceptually similar
to x. In particular, we make the following observation: if
we ask mutually exclusive sets of users about the contents
of xˆ and x, and they disagree, then we learn that x and xˆ
are definitely dissimilar; otherwise, we learn that they are
likely similar. Our observation is motivated by Papernot et
al.’s approach to determine that their attack is imperceptible
to humans [23].
Motivated by the above-mentioned observation, we fol-
lowed a between-subject design for each study, assigning
each participant to one of three conditions: CB , CAI , and
CAP . In all the conditions, participants were shown im-
ages and were asked to select the label (i.e., category) that
best describes the image out of ten possible labels (e.g., the
digit shown in the image). The conditions differed in the na-
ture of images shown to the participants. Participants in CB
(“benign” condition) were shown unaltered images from
standard datasets. Participants in CAI (“adversarial and im-
perceptible” condition) were shown adversarial examples of
images in CB that fool state-of-the-art DNNs. The images
in CAI have small Lp distances to images in CB , and were
not designed to mislead humans. Participants in CAP (“ad-
versarial and perceptible” condition) were shown variants of
the images in CB that are close in Lp distance to their coun-
terparts in CB , but were designed to mislead both humans
and DNNs. To lower the mental burden on participants,
each participant was asked only 25 image-categorization
questions. Because the datasets we used contain thumbnail
images (see below), we presented the images to participants
in three different sizes: original size, resized ×2, and re-
sized ×4. Additionally to categorizing images, we asked
participants in all conditions about their level of confidence
in their answers on a 5-point Likert scale (one denotes low
confidence and five denotes high confidence). The protocol
was approved by Carnegie Mellon’s review board.
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Conceptually, the responses of participants in CB help
us estimate humans’ accuracy on benign images (i.e., their
likelihood to pick the labels consistent with the ground
truth). By comparing the accuracy of users in CAI to CB ,
we learn whether the attack and the threshold on Lp dis-
tance that we pick result in imperceptible attacks. We hy-
pothesize that images in CAI are likely to be categorized
correctly by users. Hence, the attack truly crafts adversar-
ial examples, and poses risk to the integrity of DNNs at the
chosen threshold. In contrast, by comparing CAP with CB ,
we hope to show that, for the same threshold, it is possible
to find instances that mislead humans and DNNs. Namely,
we hypothesize that the accuracy of users on CAP is signif-
icantly lower than their accuracy on CB . If our hypothesis
is validated, we learn that small Lp distance does not ensure
perceptual similarity.
Datasets and DNNs. In the studies, we used images
from the MNIST [15] and CIFAR10 [13] datasets. MNIST
is a dataset of 28×28 pixel images of digits, while CIFAR10
is a dataset of 32 × 32 pixel images that contain ten object
categories: airplanes, automobiles, birds, cats, deer, dogs,
frogs, horses, ships, and trucks. Both MNIST and CIFAR10
are widely used for developing both attacks on DNNs and
defenses against them (e.g., [7, 17, 23]).
In conditions CAI and CAP , we created attacks against
two DNNs published by Madry et al. [17]—one for MNIST,
and another for CIFAR10. The MNIST DNN is highly
accurate, achieving 98.8% accuracy on the MNIST test
set. The CIFAR10 DNN also achieves a relatively high
accuracy—87.3% on CIFAR10’s test set. More notably,
both DNNs are two of the most resilient models to adversar-
ial examples (specifically, ones with bounded L∞ distance
from benign samples) known to date.
4.2. Participants
We recruited a total of 399 participants from the United
States through the Prolific crowdsourcing platform. Their
ages ranged from 18 to 78, with a mean of 32.85 and stan-
dard deviation of 11.54. The demographics of our partici-
pants were slightly skewed toward males: 59% reported to
be males, 39% reported to be females, and 1% preferred
not to specify their gender. 34% of the participants were
students, and 84% were employed at least partially. Partic-
ipants took an average of roughly six minutes to complete
the study and were compensated $1.
4.3. Insufficiency of L0
Study Details. We used the MNIST dataset and DNN
to test whether it is possible to perturb images only slightly
on L0 while simultaneously misleading humans and DNNs.
CB was assigned 75 randomly selected images from the test
set of MNIST. All 75 images were correctly classified by
the DNN. We used the Jacobian Saliency Map Approach
CB CAI CAP
(a) L0
CB CAI CAP
(b) L2
CB CAI CAP
(c) L∞
Figure 2: Sample images from the three conditions we had
for each Lp-norm. Each row shows three variants of the
same image.
(JSMA) [23], as implemented in Cleverhans [22], to craft
adversarial examples for CAI . We limited the amount of
change applied to an image to at most 15% of the pixels,
and found that JSMA was able to find successful attacks
for 68 out of 75 images. For successful attacks, JSMA
perturbed 4.90% (2.91% standard deviation) of pixels on
average—this is comparable to the result of Papernot et
al. [23]. Images in CAP were crafted manually. Using
a photo-editing software2 while simultaneously receiving
feedback from the DNN, a member of our team edited the
75 images from CB while attempting to minimize the num-
ber of pixels changed such that the resulting image would
be misclassified by both humans and the DNN. The average
L0 distance of images inCAP from their counterparts inCB
is 4.48% (2.45% standard deviation). Examples of the im-
ages in the three conditions are shown in Fig. 2a. We note
that because creating the images for CAP involves time-
consuming manual effort, we limited each condition to at
most 75 images.
A total of 201 participants were assigned to the L0 study:
73 were assigned to CB , 59 to CAI , and 69 to CAP .
2GIMP (https://www.gimp.org/)
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(c) L∞
Figure 3: User performance for the three Lp-norms that we studied. For each condition (CB , CAI , and CAP ), we report the
users’ average accuracy, and the accuracy when labeling each image by the majority vote (over the labels provided by the
participants). Accuracy is the fraction of labels that are consistent with the ground truth.
Experiment results. We computed the users’ accu-
racy (i.e., how often their responses agreed with the ground
truth), and the accuracy when classifying each image ac-
cording to the majority vote over all labels provided by the
users. Fig. 3a shows the results. We found that users’ av-
erage accuracy was high for the unaltered images of CB
(95%) and adversarial images of CAI (97%), but low for
the images of CAP (3%). In fact, if we classify images
via majority votes, none of the images of CAP would be
classified correctly. The difference between users’ average
accuracy in CB and CAI is not statistically significant ac-
cording to a t-test (p = 0.34). In contrast, the difference
between users’ average accuracy in CAP and other condi-
tions is statistically significant (p < 0.01). Users in all the
conditions were confident in their responses—the average
confidence levels ranged from 4.19 (CAP ) to 4.47 (CB).
The results support our hypotheses. While it is possible
to find adversarial examples with small L0 distance from
benign samples, it is possible, for the same distance, to find
samples that are not imperceptible to humans. In fact, hu-
mans may be highly confident that those samples belong to
other classes.
4.4. Insufficiency of L2
Study Details. We used the CIFAR10 dataset and DNN
to test L2 for insufficiency. We randomly picked 100 im-
ages from the test set that were correctly classified by the
DNN for CB . For each image in CB , we created (what we
hoped would be) an imperceptible adversarial example for
CAI . Images in CAI have a fixed L2 distance of 6 from
their counterparts in CB . Because we did not find evidence
in the literature for an upper bound on L2 distance that is
is still imperceptible to humans, we chose a distance of 6
empirically—our results (below) support this choice. To
create the adversarial examples, we used an iterative gra-
dient descent approach, in the vein of prior work [2], albeit
with two notable differences. First, we used an algorithm
by Wang et al. [33] to initialize the attack to an image that
has high SSIM to the benign image, but lies at a fixed L2
distance from it. The rationale behind this was to increase
the perceptual similarity between the adversarial image and
the benign image. Second, we ensured that the L2-norm of
the perturbation is fixed by normalizing it to 6 after each
iteration of the attack. The images of CAP we generated
via a similar approach to those of CAI . The only differ-
ence is that we initialized the attack with an image that has
low SSIM with respect to its counterpart benign image us-
ing Wang et al.’s algorithm. Fig. 2b shows a sample of the
images that we used in the L2 study.
In total, we had 99 participants assigned to the L2 study:
25 were assigned to CB , 38 to CAI , and 36 to CAP .
Experiment results. Users’ average accuracy and the
accuracy of the majority vote are shown in Fig. 3b. On
the benign images of CB , users had an average accuracy
of 93%. Their average accuracy on the images of CAI
was 89%, not significantly lower (p ≈ 1). Moreover, we
found that users in CB and CAI were almost equally con-
fident about their choices (averages of 4.31 and 4.37). We
thus concluded that 6 is a reasonable bound for L2 attacks.
In stark contrast, we found that CAP users’ average accu-
racy dropped to 57% and confidence to 2.97 (p < 0.01 for
both). In other words, users’ likelihood to make mistakes
increased by 36%, on average, and their confidence in their
decisions decreased remarkably.
The results support our hypotheses, as a significant frac-
tion of attack samples with bounded L2 can be perceptually
different than their corresponding benign samples.
4.5. Insufficiency of L∞
Study Details. Similarly to the L2 study, we used the
CIFAR10 dataset and DNN also for theL∞ study. We again
picked 100 random images from the test set for CB . For
CAI , we generated adversarial examples with L∞ distance
of 0.1 from benign examples, as done by Goodfellow et
al. [7]. We generated the adversarial examples using the
Projected Gradient Descent algorithm [17], with a simple
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tweak to enhance imperceptibility: after each gradient de-
scent iteration, we increased SSIM with respect to benign
images using Wang et al.’s algorithm [33]. Examples in
CAP were generated using a similar algorithm, but we de-
creased the SSIM with respect to benign images instead of
increasing it.
In total, we had 99 participants assigned to the study: 36
were assigned to CB , 31 to CAI , and 32 to CAP .
Experiment results. The accuracy results are sum-
marized in Fig. 3c. On benign examples, users’ average
accuracy was 91%. Their average confidence score was
4.45. The attacks in CAI were not completely impercep-
tible: users’ average accuracy decreased to 79% and confi-
dence score to 3.98 (both significant with p < 0.01). How-
ever, attacks in CAP were significantly less similar to be-
nign images: users’ average accuracy and confidence score
were 36% and 3.04 (p < 0.01).
Our hypotheses hold also for L∞—a significant fraction
of attacks with relatively small L∞ can be perceptually dif-
ferent to humans than benign images.
5. Discussion
The results of the user studies confirm our hypotheses—
defining similarity using L0, L2, and L∞-norms can be in-
sufficient for ensuring perceptual similarity in some cases.
Here, we discuss some of the limitations of this work, and
discuss some alternatives for Lp-norms.
5.1. Limitations
A couple of limitations should be considered when in-
terpreting our results. First, we demonstrated our results on
two DNNs and for two datasets, and so they may not apply
for every DNN and image-recognition task. The DNNs that
we considered are among the most resilient models to ad-
versarial examples to date. Consequently, we believe that
the attacks we generated against them for CAI and CAP
would succeed against other DNNs. Depending on the cho-
sen thresholds, our results may or may not directly apply
to specific combinations of norms and image-recognition
tasks that we did not consider in this work. While study-
ing more combinations may be useful, we believe that our
findings are impactful in their current form, as the combi-
nations of norms, thresholds, and datasets we considered
are commonly used in practice (e.g., [2, 7, 23, 29]). We
note that it may be possible to achieve sufficient conditions
for perceptual similarity by using lower thresholds than in
our experiments. Stated differently, it may be impossible to
fool humans using lower thresholds. However, decreasing
thresholds may also prevent algorithms for crafting attacks
from finding successful adversarial examples (namely, the
ones that are part of CAI in the experimental conditions).
Second, we estimated similarity using a proxy: whether
participants’ categorizations of perturbed images were con-
sistent with their categorizations of their benign counter-
parts. However, similarity has different facets that may or
may not be interesting, depending on the threat model be-
ing studied. For instance, in some cases we may want to
estimate whether certain attacks are inconspicuous or not
(e.g., to learn whether TSA agents would detect disguised
individuals attempting to mislead surveillance systems). In
such cases, we want to measure whether adversarial images
are “close enough” to benign images to the extent that a hu-
man observer cannot reliably tell between adversarial and
non-adversarial images. We believe that future work should
develop a better understanding of this and other notions of
similarity and how to assess them as a means to help us im-
prove current attacks and defenses.
5.2. Alternatives to Lp-norms
We next list several alternative distance metrics for as-
sessing similarity and provide a preliminary assessment of
their suitability as a replacement for Lp-norms.
Our results show that by using the same threshold for
all samples, one may generate adversarial images that mis-
lead humans—thus, they are not imperceptible. As a solu-
tion, one may consider setting a different threshold for every
sample to ensure that the attacks’ output would be imper-
ceptible. In this case, a principled automated method would
be needed to set the sample-dependent thresholds in order
to create attacks at scale. Without such a method, human
feedback may be needed in the process for every sample.
Other similarity-assessment measures, such as
SSIM [33] and the “minimal” transform needed to
align two images, that have been used in prior work
(e.g., [10, 26]) may be considered to replace Lp-norms.
Additionally, one may consider image-similarity metrics
that have not been previously used in the adversarial
examples literature, such as Perceptual Image Diff [36]
and the Universal Quality Index [32]. Such metrics should
be treated with care, as they may lead to unnecessary and
insufficient conditions for perceptual similarity. For exam-
ple, SSIM is sensitive to small geometric transformation
(e.g., the SSIM between the images in Fig. 1b is 0.36
out of 1, which is relatively low [33]). So, using SSIM
to define similarity may lead to unnecessary conditions.
Moreover, as demonstrated in Fig. 4, SSIM may be high
even when two images are not similar. Thus, SSIM may
lead to insufficient conditions for similarity.
The recent work of Jang et al. suggests three metrics to
evaluate the similarity between adversarial examples and
benign inputs [9]. The metrics evaluate adversarial per-
turbations’ quality by how much they corrupt the Fourier
transform, their effect on edges, or their effect on the im-
ages’ gradients. This work appears to take a step in the
right direction. However, further validation of the proposed
metrics is needed. For instance, we speculate that slight ge-
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Figure 4: SSIM can be high between two images contain-
ing different objects or subjects. Despite showing differ-
ent animals or subjects (the bottom image in (b) was cre-
ated by swapping the faces of actress Judi Dench and actor
Daniel Craig), the SSIM value between the images in (a)
and (b) is high—0.89 between the top images, and 0.95 be-
tween the bottom images. Images in (c) were created by
adding uniform noise to images in (a). The SSIM value
between (a) and (c) is 0.77 for the images at the top, and
0.87 for the images at the bottom. (Sources of images in
(a) and (b): https://goo.gl/Mxo9mK, https://
goo.gl/GEd6Bs, https://goo.gl/mvvFZ1, and
https://goo.gl/vwuK9t.)
ometric transformations to a benign image might affect the
gradients in the image dramatically. Thus, metrics based on
gradients alone may be unnecessary for defining conditions
for perceptual similarity.
Lastly, one may consider using several metrics simul-
taneously to define similarity (e.g., by allowing geomet-
ric transformations and perturbations with small Lp-norm
to craft adversarial examples [4]). While this may be a
promising direction, metrics should be combined with spe-
cial care. As the conjunction of one or more unneces-
sary conditions leads to an unnecessary condition, and the
disjunction of one or more insufficient conditions leads to
an insufficient condition, simply conjoining or disjoining
metrics may not solve the (in)sufficiency and (un)necessity
problems of prior definitions of similarity.
Finding better measures for assessing perceptual simi-
larity remains an open problem. Better similarity measures
could help improve both algorithms for finding adversarial
examples and, more importantly, defenses against them. In
the absence of such measures, we recommend that future
research rely not only on known metrics for perceptual sim-
ilarity assessment, but also on human-subject studies.
6. Conclusion
In this work, we aimed to develop a better understanding
of the suitability of Lp-norms for measuring the similarity
between adversarial examples and benign images. Specifi-
cally, we complemented our knowledge that conditions on
Lp distances used for defining similarity are unnecessary
in some cases—i.e., they may not capture all imperceptible
attacks—and showed that they can also be insufficient—i.e.,
they may lead one to conclude that an adversarial instance
is similar to a benign instance when it is not so. Hence, Lp-
distance metrics may be unsuitable for assessing similarity
when crafting adversarial examples and defending against
them. We pointed out possible alternatives for Lp-norms
to assess similarity, though they seem to have limitations,
too. Thus, there is a need for further research to improve
the assessment of similarity when developing attacks and
defenses for adversarial examples.
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